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Securitization theory and securitization studies  
 
Rita Taureck  
 
 
Opposed to the recently fashionable ‘moral and ethical’ criticism levelled against Ole 
Wæver’s securitization theory this article argues that such criticism fundamentally 
misconceives the analytical goal of securitization theory, which is namely to offer a 
tool for practical security analysis. In arguing that being political (critical) on the part 
of the analyst has no bearing on the type of practical security analysis that can be done 
using securitization theory, this article proposes that the analytical goal of such 
criticism and that of securitization theory are incommensurable; in the process 
rendering obsolete this kind of criticism of securitization theory. By way of 
reconciling securitization theory with its critics, however, this article takes up 
Wæver’s suggestion of wider securitization studies in which moral and ethical 





In recent years Ole Wæver’s securitization theory has been subjected to a seemingly 
never-ending stream of criticism enthused by moral and ethical motives. Much of this 
moral/ethical criticism comes from other critical security theories and in general has 
taken two different forms. The first is concerned with the absence of a normative 
conceptualization of securitization/desecuritization within the analytical framework of 
securitization theory. And the second centres on the alleged disregard for the political 
consequences of Wæver’s writing and speaking security himself, in his role as a 
security analyst (by extension, here Wæver stands for everyone using securitization 
theory). Such critics come from the entire spectrum of critical security theory. 
Because of this, and since it is difficult to capture the work of individual theorists 
within the canonical boxes of but one theory, such critics will be called here 
‘normative security theorists’. Throughout this article particular emphasis is placed on 
the work of Claudia Aradau, whose work in the article ‘Security and the democratic 
scene: desecuritization and emancipation’ published in the December 2004 edition of 
this journal, offers one of the model arguments this article criticizes. The present 
article can thus be partly read as a direct response to Aradau’s article.  
 Although, and as this article will show, much of this criticism has some utility, 
this utility, however, is not with regard to securitization theory. This is because most 
of this particular form of criticism is based on a total misunderstanding of the 
premises of securitization theory. Taking its lead from Wendt (1999) who argues that 
different research agendas pose different questions, and from Campbell (1998) who 
argues that the purpose of analysis differs significantly among the different forms of 
critical security studies, this article will argue that ‘securitization theory’ aims to 
answer fundamentally different questions than normative critical security studies, 
making the goals of the two approaches incommensurable. Based on this premise it 
will be argued that the moral/ethical criticism levelled at securitization theory is 
fundamentally flawed. Despite this, some of the criticism is clearly useful and, 
following Wæver, this article will argue for the accommodation of the normative 
research question within the realm of wider ‘securitization studies’.  
 This article begins with a brief overview of securitization theory, focusing on 
what it is, and on what can be done with it. It will then outline the moral and ethical 
criticisms levelled against the theory, followed by an explanation of where and how 
they fall short. Having disarmed the normative critics of securitization theory I will 
then seek to embrace them and explain why they are nonetheless useful. 
 I do not wish to claim that securitization theory is a flawless approach that 
cannot be criticized. Indeed, there is a number of valid criticisms whose enunciators 
conceive rightly of what securitization theory is and what it can/ cannot do. Given the 




Before I turn to the critics it is necessary to understand securitization theory for what 
it is and not for what some think it should be. The main argument of securitization 
theory is that security is a (illocutionary) speech act, that solely by uttering ‘security’ 
something is being done. ‘It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes 
one’ (Wæver 2004: 13). By stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its 
existence, a securitizing actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the 
referent object’s survival. The issue is then moved out of the sphere of normal politics 
into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without 
the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making. For security this 
means that it no longer has any given (pre-existing) meaning but that it can be 
anything a securitizing actor says it is. Security is a social and intersubjective 
construction. That is the meaning of security. 
 To prevent ‘everything’ from becoming a security issue, a successful 
securitization consists of three steps. These are: (1) identification of existential 
threats; (2) emergency action; and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free 
of rules (Buzan et al. 1998: 6). To present an issue as an existential threat is to say 
that: ‘If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we 
will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 
24). This first step towards a successful securitization is called a securitizing move. A 
securitizing move is in theory an option open to any unit because only once an actor 
has convinced an audience (inter-unit relations) of its legitimate need to go beyond 
otherwise binding rules and regulations (emergency mode) can we identify a case of 
securitization. In practice, securitization is thus far from being open to all units and 
their respective subjective threats. Rather, it is largely based on power and capability 
and therewith the means to socially and politically construct a threat. In this way the 
study of security remains wide, but with restrictions pertaining to ‘who’ can securitize 
it is neither unmanageable nor incoherent. This being said it should be noted that 
Wæver (1998) is extremely critical of framing issues in terms of security. For him: 
‘security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal 
politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Because of this, he favours a strategy of 
desecuritization whereby securitization is reversed and issues are moved out of ‘the 
threat — defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere’ where they can be 
dealt with in accordance with the rules of the (democratic) political system (ibid.). 
Although this is clearly a normative statement on the part of Wæver, it is important to 
notice that it has no bearing on what securitization theory can do. This is so — and 
this will become much clearer later in this article — because securitization and for 
that matter desecuritization are political acts and therefore outside of the securitization 
theorist’s personal preference. 
This brief overview shows that securitization theory is not a political statement on the 
part of the analyst, but that securitization theory is instead a theoretical tool of 
analysis with which the analyst can trace incidences of securitization and 
desecuritization. Securitization theory by itself does not enable the analyst to say what 
security should be/not be. Securitization theory thus seeks to answer the question — 
what does security do? — and little beyond this. In this understanding, securitization 
theory is nothing but a theoretical tool to facilitate practical security analysis.  
 
Securitization Theory and Its Moral/Ethical Critics 
 
Considering these relatively clear guidelines on what securitization theory is, what it 
can do, what it cannot do and what is its purpose, it is quite surprising that much of 
the criticism voiced against ‘securitization theory’ is actually a result of something 
that was never intended to be part of the realm of the theory. Thus, much of this 
criticism focuses on the absence of any moral/ ethical goals of the theory, and some 
critics even go as far as to argue that the moral/ethical goals inherent in the theory — 
despite there being none — are false and unethical. How is this possible? The only 
logical explanation is a misunderstanding of securitization theory by these analysts. 
Whether or not this misunderstanding is intentional (political) or unintentional is 
largely irrelevant as the outcome of the serious misrepresentation of securitization 
theory remains the same.  
 In order to show what form this misunderstanding takes I will outline some of 
the most recent criticisms of securitization theory that in my view have led to the most 
serious misrepresentations of the theory. In what follows, unless otherwise stated 
securitization theory always refers to political processes of both securitization and 
desecuritization. Admittedly, much of the criticism in question focuses on the under 
theorized concept of desecuritization since, like securitization, desecuritization is but 
a political act, this does not change the core argument of this article. Some of the most 
fundamental misrepresentations of securitization theory of late can be found in the 
writings of Claudia Aradau. Drawing on Jef Huysmans, who himself contributed 
much criticism of this type against securitization theory, Aradau criticizes the 
moral/ethical dimension in the process of securitization. For her, citing Huysmans,  
 
[securitization] is: a technique of government which retrieves the ordering 
force of the fear of violent death by a mythical replay of the variations of 
the Hobbesian state of nature. It manufactures a sudden rupture in the 
routinized, everyday life by fabricating an existential threat which 
provokes experiences of the real possibility of violent death (Aradau 
2001).  
 
 Following this understanding, it becomes clear that securitization here means 
something very different than it does in Wæver’s approach. Thus, no longer is 
securitization viewed as a theoretical tool that facilities actors’ analysis but rather we 
get to see securitization from the point of view of the securitizing actor, namely as a 
political method. Here securitization undoubtedly becomes an ethically and morally 
laden issue that by its very nature is stigmatized as bad. In Aradau’s words: ‘[…] both 
securitising and desecuritising techniques can have disquieting consequences and […] 
ethico-political concerns should have prevalence with both securitization and 
desecuritization or, paraphrasing Michael Dillon, that the story of security should 
always be an ethical one’ (Aradau 2001). Considering this quote it becomes even 
more obvious that we are talking about two different things here, namely 
‘securitization the theory’ and ‘securitization the normative practice’. If that is all 
there is, then there should be no problem. However, this is not the case as all of 
Aradau’s and also Huysmans’ writings of this type are direct criticisms of Wæver’s 
securitization theory.  
 How is this possible? What is such criticism based upon? This criticism is 
based on the idea that the analyst is never neutral (innocent) in speaking and writing 
(about) security, but rather co-constitutes political reality. Here, the idea is that the 
analyst in writing (speaking) about a particular social reality is partly responsible for 
the co-constitution of this very reality, as by means of his own text this reality is 
(re)produced. For Wæver — as for all constructivists — such a critique is defeatist as 
he ‘reproduces the security agenda when [he] describes how the process of 
securitization works’ (Huysmans 1995: 69). The only comfort in this dilemma is 
perhaps that this applies to all constructivist security analysis, as their ‘particular 
understanding of language makes any security utterance potentially securitizing’ 
(Huysmans 1999: 26). Consequently, no such utterance is ever ‘innocent or neutral’ 
(ibid.). Huysmans pointedly calls this ‘the normative dilemma of speaking and writing 
security’.  
 
Like a promise is an effect of language, that is, of successfully making the 
promise, a security problem results from successfully speaking or writing 
security. It is the utterance of ‘security’ which politically introduces 
security questions in a publicly contested policy area. Thus, if successfully 
performed the speech act makes a security problem (Huysmans 1999: 8).  
 
 In other words, in writing or speaking security the analyst him/herself executes 
a speech act. This speech act is successful if the problem raised becomes recognized 
as a security problem in the academy and/or in the wider policymaking discourse. For 
constructivists, including Wæver, the only way is to ‘accept the normative dilemma as 
a dilemma. [The securitization analyst] cannot escape from the fact that its own 
security writing risks to contribute to the securitization of an area’ (Huysmans 1999: 
18 and, in recognition of this fact, Wæver 1999: 338).  
 For Aradau, the existence of the normative dilemma of writing and speaking 
security means that ‘securitization theory’ and ‘securitization as a normative practice’ 
merge into one — a ‘normative securitization theory’ which, as I will shortly show, is 
an oxymoron. For Aradau, the co-constitution of political reality on the part of the 
analyst means that the analyst has a political responsibility (Aradau 2004: 389). An 
analyst using securitization theory is therefore political in its very nature. Given the 
inescapable nature of the dilemma of speaking and writing security this assertion is 
true, yet now the question is does this matter? From Aradau’s position the answer to 
this question is obviously yes. For her, the whole point of security studies is to 
problematize existing patterns of security and insecurity. ‘[S]ecurity [….] needs to be 
struggled against by appealing to the concept of emancipation, a concept informed by 
a logic opposed to the logic of security’ (Aradau 2004: 401). For Aradau then security 
is necessarily bad, in fact it is the ultimate disciplining governmental technology. In 
citing Walker (1997: 78), Aradau reminds us why we have to be political:  
 
[…] it is only in the context of the subject of security that it is ‘possible to 
envisage a critical discourse about security, a discourse which engages 
with contemporary transformations of political life, with emerging 
accounts of who we might become, and the conditions under which we 
might become other than we are now without destroying others, ourselves, 
or the planet on which we all live’ (Aradau 2004: 399). 
 
While for normative theorists being political lies at the very heart of their approach to 
security, in Wæver’s securitization theory being political (intended or unintended) is 
only of secondary importance. This is because being political ‘can never replace the 
political act [that is securitisation/desecuritisation] as such’ (Wæver 2000: 252). 
Securitization/desecuritization is a political choice by a securitizing actor, which the 
analyst seeks to uncover by means of using securitization theory; hence at this level 
whether or not the analyst agrees with the securitization/desecuritization in question is 
irrelevant. Based on this analysis I would like to suggest that in their respective 
analytical goals normative security theory and securitization theory are 
incommensurable and, as a result, the ethical/moral criticism directed at securitization 
theory is misplaced. This incommensurability becomes obvious when comparing 
which questions the respective research agendas seek to answer, thus securitization 
theory seeks to answer the positivist question: what does security do? Whereas 
normative security theorists seek to answer the normative question: what should 
security do? Misrepresentations and/or faulty criticisms of this kind are not rare in the 
social sciences as time and again theorists set out to criticize other theorists without 
considering which kinds of questions the other approach actually sets out to answer. 
Were, to use David Campbell’s phrase, ‘the mission statement’ (Campbell 1998: 226) 
of the other theorist to be observed, then much unfruitful criticism could be avoided. 
It would therefore be useful if every critical engagement would start with thinking 
about the compatibility between the approaches in question. Alexander Wendt in his 
seminal work Social Theory of International Relations shows us how this should be 
done. Throughout the book Wendt keeps on reminding the reader that the difference 
between research projects — for Wendt rationalism and constructivism — ‘is merely 
that they ask different questions, and different questions need not involve substantive 
conflict’ (Wendt 1999: 33). Such a strategy — as Wendt’s book clearly shows — 
does not mean that there can be no criticism, but rather it means that there is a limit to 
what kind of criticism is fruitful. A criticism that starts from an approach that is 
incommensurable with the theory to be criticized, aimed at muddling the two together, 
is neither fruitful nor coherent. Yet this is exactly what Aradau and others have tried 
to do with securitization theory.  
 In some ways, however, this is understandable. After all, securitization theory 
offers one of the most concise and attractive analytical tools in critical security studies 
today. Moreover, in defence of the critics it could be argued that Wæver, by referring 
to himself as a ‘post-structural realist’ with little explanation of what this is supposed 
to be, as well as his leaving ‘desecuritization’ under theorized, leaves the door wide 
open for interpretation. To name but one example, to see what form this interpretation 
can take it is worthwhile considering Thomas Diez’s and Atsuko Higashino’s recent 
proposition that desecuritization entails a strong Habermasian element as it opens up 
political debate, in that it bears close resemblance to Habermas’ ‘ideal speech 
situation’ — ‘the situation in which argumentative behaviour prevails over strategic 
behaviour’ (Diez and Higashino 2004: 3). In this understanding then, desecuritization 
itself — as the absence of a world framed in terms of security — becomes an 
emancipatory ideal. In light of my earlier argument that securitization theory cannot 
possibly have such normative connotations it appears that all such arguments 
necessarily become redundant. However, does this mean that they are not useful? 
Does this mean that they contribute nothing to the subject of security? Of course not! 
To be sure, arguments such as Diez’s and Higashino’s as well as Huysmans’ and 
Aradau’s are far from redundant. This said, two questions arise: what can be done 
with such criticism? And, what do they offer to the securitization analyst? Perhaps 
surprisingly a solution to this problem can be found in Wæver’s writings where he 
suggests an outlet for such normative approaches to securitization/desecuritization, in 
something he labels ‘securitization studies’ (Wæver 2000: 253). For Wæver 
‘securitization studies’ become the realm wherein the securitization theorist is freed 
from the ties of securitization theory (i.e. merely observing what is going on), [….] as 
it is here where the analyst can be political and argue either for or against an incidence 
of securitization. Informed by securitization studies, Wæver hopes that ‘political 
action [….] might be able to contribute to minimizing or curtailing dynamics of 
mutual provocation and securitization’ (ibid.). Thus, it is here where the securitization 
analyst can support an emancipatory ideal. It is here where Wæver himself finds an 
outlet for his own preference for desecuritization.  
 Having said this, it is important to note that for Wæver, policy-makers cannot 
simply be informed/advised on the basis of an ill-defined emancipatory ideal (such as 
the post-structuralist security theorist’s desire to radically open up debate and struggle 
against security) because all political situations are unique and therefore no single 
solution can ever suit all problems. Accordingly, it must be the task of the security 
analyst to act virtuously in both his analysis and advice.  
 
As a security/securitisation analyst, this means accepting the task of trying 
to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try and 
assist in shaping the continent [Europe] in a way that creates the least 
insecurity and violence — even if this occasionally means invoking/ 
producing ‘structures’ or even using the dubious instrument of 
securitisation (Wæver 2000: 285).  
 
From a theoretical point of view then, securitization studies serve as an outlet for all 
those moral and ethical criticisms that are of no relevance to securitization theory. 
This said, however, it is crucial to notice that from the point of view of a 
securitization theorist the moral/ethical advice offered within the wider realm of 
securitization studies is subordinate to the findings of securitization theory as — and I 
reiterate — being political can never replace the political act that is 




This article has aimed to draw attention to the fact that much of the recently voiced 
morally and ethically motivated criticism against securitization theory completely 
misperceives the analytical goal inherent in the theory. This article has dared to make 
the unfashionable argument of incommensurability, in that it argues that the aims of 
‘securitization theory’ and what has been called here ‘normative security theory’ are 
beyond comparability. Initially much criticism was voiced against the work of 
Claudia Aradau, whose work has merely been singled out as a prime example of such 
misconceived criticism. Despite the argument of incommensurability and the rejection 
of normative criticism’s utility for securitization theory, it has been argued that such 
criticism becomes relevant within the framework of wider ‘securitization studies’ 
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